Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 1983

Article 4

January 1983

Litigating against the Government for Fun and Profit? A Review of
Recent Environmental Attorneys' Fee Decisions
Donald W. Stever Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr

Recommended Citation
Donald W. Stever Jr., Litigating against the Government for Fun and Profit? A Review of Recent
Environmental Attorneys' Fee Decisions, 1 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 12 (1983)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Litigating Against the Government for Fun
and Profit?
A Review of Recent Environmental
Attorneys' Fee Decisions
DONALD W. STEVER, JR.*
I. Introduction
A number of federal environmental laws provide for the
award of attorneys' fees to litigants who bring lawsuits under
the statute's citizen suit or judicial review provisions.' Although some of these statutory provisions vary in language,
most are similar or identical to the provision in the Clean Air
Act which allows for the award of "reasonable" attorneys' fees
"whenever the court determines that such an award is appropriate."2 These provisions, little used in the past, have recently produced several large fee awards against the govern* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Lehigh University;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania. The author served as Chief of the Pollution Control
and Environmental Defense Sections, United States Department of Justice, 1979-82.
1. Citizen suit provisions for fee awards are contained in the following statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (Supp. V 1981); Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (Supp. V 1981); Deepwater Port Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1976); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976)
[hereinafter ESA]; Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1976);
Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1976); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (Supp. V 1981); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter OCSLA]; Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §300(j)(8)(d) (1976); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1270(d) (Supp. V 1981); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2).
Judicial review provisions for fee awards are contained in the following statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (Supp. V 1981); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1976); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5)
(Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (Supp. V 1981).
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ment as well as a tangle of confused court of appeals decisions.
The Supreme Court will decide some of the issues that have
troubled the lower courts in a case awaiting decision in the
3
current term.
Since attorneys' fees may not be awarded by federal
courts in the absence of express statutory authorization, 4 the
scope of fee awards under these environmental statutes must
be defined by the statutes themselves. Unfortunately, Congress chose "appropriateness" as the standard. Although
there is some legislative history to shed light on congressional
intent, 5 the statutes are open to varying interpretation as to
how claims should be judged under this vague standard.
Before the enactment of environmental fee award provisions, most statutorily and judicially created fee awards
adopted the common law "prevailing party" standard. Only a
party who prevailed on the balance of his claims was entitled
to have his fee paid by the opposing party.6 The fee was
calculated by first determining the market value of the attorney's services (the "lodestar" fee) and then by either increasing or decreasing the amount of the fee according to the
"quality of the representation" and the "contingent nature of
7
success."

3. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982). See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 51 U.S.L.W. 4552 (U.S. May
17, 1983) (attorney's fees awarded under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976 to prevailing plaintiffs only for time spent on successful claims).
4. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). But see
Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1229 (1973) (equitable exceptions to the Alyeska rule). See
generally Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 677 (1983).
5. 122 Cong. Rec. 32,855 (1976); Legislative History of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, Senate Comm. on Public Works and Environment, 728, 730 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (civil rights
statute); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (civil rights) (the
cases cited are opinions on the merits, not addressing attorneys' fee awards); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F. 2d 102
(3d Cir. 1976) (private antitrust action under Sherman Act).
7. Lindy Bros., 540 F.2d 102; Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc). The lodestar fee is further refined by other factors. If the case is unsuccessful, the contingency adjustment may incorporate a delay in receipt of payment for
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Congress's failure to incorporate the prevailing party
standard in environmental statutes has spawned many interesting issues:
(1) Is a losing party entitled to reimbursement of attorney's fees?
(2) Is recovery limited to "public interest" litigants?
(3) Can an intervenor recover attorney's fees?
(4) Is recovery limited to parties whose motive is to "protect" the environment?
Before 1977, the appropriateness standard was found
principally in citizen suit provisions. Cases involved claimants who either sought to compel recalcitrant defendants to
comply with the law,8 or to compel federal officials to carry out
nondiscretionary duties.9 Most of the early cases did not
involve claims against the government, but against private
party defendants. In 1976, by adding fee award provisions to
the statutes governing judicial review of agency rules and
orders, Congress increased the potential for large awards
against the government.
The Justice Department unsuccessfully sought to influence the direction of litigation brought after the enactment of
the fee provisions in pleadings opposing fee awards.' 0 The
Department argued that to earn a fee, a litigant should

services rendered. Copelandat 893. The adjustment reflecting quality of representation is only used "when representation is unusually good or bad, taking into account
the level of skill normally expected of an attorney commanding the hourly rate used to
compute the lodestar'." Id.
8. Citizens As'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974),
rev'd, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353 (D. Del. 1974), aftd, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975) (no fee
award where plaintiff lost); Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of
Columbia, 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (litigation commenced prior to
1977) (fee awarded where meritorious claim mooted by government regulatory
action).
9. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (winning is not a prerequisite to a
fee award since petitioners prevailed on some issues, but not on others); Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Train, 373 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1974) (fee denied to
losing party), rev'd, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
10. See, e.g., the Government's Response to Sierra Club's request for attorneys'
fees, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (opinion on the
merits).
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prevail on issues which further the purposes of the statute
and should be the type of litigant whose lawsuit the fee
provision encourages, such as an economically disinterested
party who would not be enriched if he were to prevail on the
merits."
II. Nonprevailing Parties
A.

Sierra Club v. Gorsuch

In SierraClub v. Gorsuch, presently awaiting decision in
the Supreme Court,12 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit awarded environmental petitioners substantial attorneys' fees despite their unsuccessful challenge of
an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule.13 Raising
both procedural and statutory issues under the Clean Air Act,
the Sierra Club and other environmental groups sought review of EPA's "new source performance standards" (NSPS) for
fossil-fueled electric power plants. Petitioners did not prevail
on any issue. The court paid lip service to the government's
argument that a fee award should be premised at least on
partial success. 4 It held that the statutory requirement of
appropriateness was satisfied if the litigant "substantially
contributed" to the goals of the Act.'5
The court based its award on the statute's complexity and
the issues raised, as reflected by the length of the court's
opinion. The court denied that its substantially contributed

11. Id.
12. 672 F.2d 33.
13. Id. at 34.
14. Id. at 42 n.10.
15. Id. Sierra Club was decided on the same day as two other attorneys' fee
cases, EDF v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch,
672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J. dissenting). These three cases were circulated
among the judges of the D.C. Circuit. On the prevailing party issue, Sierra Club
represents the view of a majority of the en banc court. Footnote 10 in SierraClub was
written in response to a dissent by Judge Wilkey in Alabama Power, aimed at the
prevailing party issue (Judge Wilkey did not sit on the SierraClub panel). EDF and
Alabama Power were cases in which the claimants either substantially or partially
prevailed, and are thus on a somewhat different legal footing from Sierra Club, in
which the petitioner did not prevail.
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standard would create automatic fee awards under other
complex statutes by referring to an earlier decision in which
fees were denied to a claimant in another Clean Air Act case,
1 6 The court
American Petroleum Institute v. Costle (API).
stated that "the occasions upon which prevailing parties will
17
meet such criteria may be exceptional."

An analysis of the issues raised in API in light of the
subsequent SierraClub test yields little to justify the different treatment of the two petitioners. Each case was complex, 8
and although the API petitioners also lost, they raised issues
as significant as those raised in SierraClub.'9
B. Village of Kaktovik v. Watt
Subsequent to Sierra Club, the D.C. Circuit decided Village of Kaktovik v. Watt.20 Kaktovik consolidated suits for
injunctive relief brought by the village and environmental
groups under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs
tried, unsuccessfully, to stop the leasing of oil exploration
tracts in the Beaufort Sea, off the northeast coast of Alaska.
They sought attorneys' fees under fee provisions 2' virtually
identical to the Clean Air Act section at issue in Sierra Club.
Like the petitioners in Sierra Club, the plaintiffs in Kaktovik
had asserted proenvironmental claims. 22 The court denied the

16. SierraClub, 672 F.2d at 39. See API v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
(opinion on the merits), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982).

17. API v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176.
18. In API, industrial and environmental groups challenged EPA's revision of
the national ambient air quality standards for ozone. In Sierra Club, industrial and
environmental groups challenged EPA's new source performance standards for coalburning power plants. Both cases involved issues of improper political influence and
disputes over the standards set. The environmental groups lost on the merits in each
case, and both cases generated many opinion pages.
19. Arguably, API was more significant than Sierra Club since it involved air
quality standards with a national impact rather than the new source emission
standards for a single-source category at issue in Sierra Club.
20. 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
21. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4); OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5).
22. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in

part, and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and reversed the trial
judge's award, which had been quoted with approval in Sierra
Club.23
Although purporting to apply the substantially contributed test from Sierra Club, Judge Wilkey's majority opinion
actually narrowed the test significantly. He created a fee
recovery rule which requires that contribution to statutory
goals and performance of the claimant's attorney be "exceptional."24 Applying this rule to the Kaktovik litigation, he
distinguished Kaktovik from Sierra Club for the following
reasons:
(a) The "goals" of the Clean Air Act are purely
environmental; those of OCSLA are primarily
economic. Wilkey reasoned that although the
plaintiffs in Kaktovik served OCSLA's environmental goals, their lawsuit delayed the leasing
of new offshore oil tracts, and thus did a disser25
vice to the economic goals of the statute;
(b) The SierraClub plaintiffs attacked a nationwide
standard; the Kaktovik petitioners challenged a
single lease sale of outer continental shelf land
to an oil company, a narrower and thus less
26
"important" issue;
(c) Sierra Club raised issues of "first impression,"
while those in Kaktovik were similar to issues
27
raised in other lease sale cases;
28
(d) Sierra Club was a "more complex" case;
(e) The fact that the Kaktovik plaintiffs did not
prevail, while "not dispositive," was a "fact" to be
"considered" by the court.29

23. Sierra Club, 672 F.2d at 37 n.7. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 507 F.
Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1981).
24. Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 228.
25. Id. at 225.
26. Id. at 227.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 228.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss1/4

6

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

None of these distinctions survives scrutiny. While the
goals of OCSLA and the Clean Air Act differ, reliance on the
accomplishment of statutory goals is not a useful measure of
appropriateness in judging fee awards.
C. Analysis of Fee Award Criteriain the D.C. Circuit
The Kaktovik opinion compares what the court calls a
"marginal" threat to the bowhead whale with the "magnitude" and "critical implications" of issues raised in Sierra
Club, and the "critically important" issues raised in EDF v.
EPA30° another case in which the D.C. Circuit awarded fees to
nonprevailing parties. 31 There is no compelling reason to
characterize the three cases in this way. The fee claimants in
Sierra Club raised charges of political influence unrelated to
Clean Air Act goals, and were soundly rebuffed by the court.
They also argued for a more stringent but only marginally
significant technical standard for western power plants, a
subgroup of one type of pollution source among the hundreds
regulated under the Clean Air Act.3 2 Similarly, the principal
argument raised in EDF was simply that EPA's administrative record lacked the support necessary to establish a fiftyparts-per-million "de minimus" threshold to ban polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contaminated substances. Also lacking
in the record was a basis for labeling all transformers and
capacitors "totally enclosed," and consequently not requiring
their removal from service. 33 While protection against PCB
contamination is a substantial public concern, EDF was simply a rule-making challenge which may not have resulted in
3
any significant change to the rule on remand. 4
One can infer that the impact of offshore oil leasing on
the survival of the bowhead whale posed a concern greater

30. 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
31. Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 226-27.
32. Coal-burning power plants are a significant source of certain pollutants.
However, the adjectives used to describe Sierra Club are overstated.
33. EDF, 636 F.2d at 1270, 1279-84, 1284-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
34. In all events, comparison with EDF is somewhat unfair because the court
failed to emphasize that the petitioners in EDF had prevailed.
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than the Kaktovik court admitted. Labeling the threat to the
whales marginal, the court concluded that proposed agency
action did not jeopardize an endangered species in violation of
the Act and therefore did not raise "significant" environmental issues. This characterization unfairly saddled the fee
claimants with the burden of the court's view of their case on
the merits. For consistency's sake, the court should have
pointed out that only marginal improvement in air quality
would have resulted had the Sierra Club petitioners prevailed, and that the significance of their case should be
further discounted because they did not prevail.
Judge Wilkey also opined that Sierra Club involved a
broader set of issues than Kaktovik, which was merely a
challenge to a single sale of offshore oil exploration lease
tracts. Although the geographic reach of the rule challenged
in Sierra Club was broader, it seems unfair to premise fee
awards on this basis because a case might well raise significant legal issues if only for a circumscribed body of law under
the statute. One could, moreover, recharacterize Sierra Club
as raising a narrow set of issues. The challenged rule was only
one of dozens of rules promulgated under section 111 of the
Clean Air Act. 35 It was not the first NSPS case to be decided.
In fact, the court relied on previous NSPS cases in making its
decision36
The other distinctions proffered in the Kaktovik opinion
are no more compelling. Although the Sierra Club's factual
issues were of first impression, novel questions of statutory
interpretation were not raised. 3 Alabama Power Company v.
Costle,3 an earlier decision awarding attorneys' fees involved
many difficult issues of first impression on which the fee
claimants prevailed in part. Several of the issues raised in
Kaktovik were also of first impression in the context in which

35. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. V 1981).
36. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
37. The Sierra Club's argument that EPA could not treat western emitters
differently from eastern emitters may have involved novel statutory issues. See 657
F.2d at 328-40.
38. 606 F.2d 1068.
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they were raised. It is disingenuous for the court to conclude
that these issues were not novel because they were raised in
one or two prior controversies with which the plaintiffs had
disagreed. 39 This is not to say that the novelty of the issues
raised should not be an important component of an appropriateness test, but a court must avoid placing too much weight
on first impression since even a frequently litigated issue can
be of great importance and novel when raised in a new
context.
The Kaktovik opinion errs most when it compares the
complexities of North Slope Borough,40 SierraClub, and Alabama Power. It is difficult to understand why complexity
should be a criterion for entitlement to a fee. Complexity is
more useful in establishing fee amount once entitlement has
been established. Moreover, even if the criterion were relevant to entitlement, the Kaktovik court's application of it is
overly simplistic. Acknowledging the problems inherent in
such an analysis, the court compared complexity by measuring the number of opinion pages per case. 4' Accordingly,
Kaktovik is brief in comparison to the other opinions. The
court failed to consider, however, that Kaktovik was heard on
appeal from a district court judgment. The other cases involved direct petitions to the appeals court for review of
agency rules. To be fair, the court should have added the
pages generated by the district court to the Kaktovik total,
and subtracted from the other case totals the number of pages
generated by petitioners other than the fee claimants. The
inequity of the court's page counting is highlighted by its
double counting of the pages of Alabama Power. The court
included a preliminary opinion that was later superseded by
the court's final opinion and thus inflated the page total. An

39. Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 227.
40. 486 F. Supp. 326; 642 F.2d 589. North Slope Borough is one of the suits for
injunctive relief under OCSLA and ESA consolidated, sub nom. Kaktovik, to determine the issue of attorneys' fees.
41. Id.
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adjustment reflecting these factors reveals an insignificant
2
difference in opinion lengths.4
The court further discounted the importance of Kaktovik,
claiming that its "interpretive and implemental" (i.e., precedential) value is diminished because the plaintiff did not
prevail. 43 Contrary to the court's apparent view, a legal decision has precedential significance whatever the result. If
litigant "1"claims "X" and litigant "2" claims "not X," and the
court adopts as its rule "not X," it is true that the decision is
scant precedent for "X." It is, however, clear precedent for "not
X."

The Supreme Court has granted the government's request to review SierraClub. It will be difficult for the Court to
fashion a workable rule for fee awards since Congress has
provided little guidance for implementing the appropriateness standard under these statutes. Since Congress enacted
such a vague standard, the Court could conclude that Congress left articulation of the standard for the courts." The
Court has several options: it could adopt a prevailing party
rule; or, it could adopt a "prevailing party plus" rule, requir-

42. One might quibble with the page totals after adjustment. Nonetheless, a
minor variation in page number will not undermine the insignificant difference in
opinion length and the inadequacy of Judge Wilkey's measure of complexity.
Judge Wilkey's
Totals after
Totals
Adjustment
Kaktovik:
7
22*
Alabama Power:
90
23**
SierraClub:
122
40***
* This page total does not include rulings on motions which might have winnowed out issues prior to summary judgment.
** This page total is derived from Judge Wilkey's dissent in Alabama Power in
which he divided the opinion pages as to the issues raised by each party.
***This page total does not include the court's response to arguments made by
the Electric Utilities.
43. Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 228.
44. I say this notwithstanding Judge Wilkey's assertion, in his Alabama Power
dissent, that such unfettered discretion would amount to an unconstitutionally
standardless delegation of power to the judiciary. See 672 F.2d at 24 (dissenting
opinion). Such constitutional infirmities are more imagined than real. See Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 (1948), and United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1344
(7th Cir. 1970).
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ing that the claimant win and that he demonstrate that his
litigation contributed to the goals of the statute. Finally, the
Court could pick any formulation in between, including the
one chosen in Sierra Club or the one in Kaktovik.
III. The Well-Heeled Litigant
Three courts have addressed the entitlement of economically motivated claimants to attorneys' fees. In Alabama
Power Company v. Gorsuch,45 the D.C. Circuit awarded fees to
the District of Columbia. In Western Oil and Gas Association
v. EPA, 46 the Ninth Circuit, without opinion, refused to award
fees to a group of petroleum producers. In FloridaPower and
Light Co. v. Costle,47 the Fifth Circuit awarded fees to a public
utility.
Understandably, the specter of paying attorneys' fees to
both prevailing and nonprevailing industrial litigants troubles the government. Industry has sued under the pollution
control statutes more often than have environmental groups
and it usually spends more money in litigation than public
interest groups. Accordingly, awards to industrial litigants
would be higher.
There is little justification for such awards. Congress
intended fee provisions to encourage "watchdog" litigation
that, but for the prospect of reimbursement, would not be
brought. 48 A municipal authority may well fit within this
policy. 49 However, it is more difficult to justify public subsidies
for business litigants. Legislative history does not support
such awards. On the contrary, Senators commenting on the
fee provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
stated that the provision was not intended to provide further
incentive for economically motivated litigants to challenge
regulatory decisions. 5°
45.
46.
47.
48.
at 12.
49.
50.

672 F.2d 1.
633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion on the merits).
683 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1982).
AlabamaPower, 672 F.2d at 3 (majority opinion). See also dissenting opinion
Id.
See supra note 5.

11

1983]

LITIGATING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

23

IV. The Intervenor
Environmental regulatory litigation has involved more
intervening petitioners and respondents than most other administrative litigation. Multiparty cases have become common. 51 Typically, a group of consolidated challenges to a rule
brings together both environmental and industrial petitioners taking opposite positions on the rule, with each intervening on behalf of the government with respect to the other's
petition. The intervenor will then submit a "me-too" brief,
either repeating the government's position or proposing additional arguments with which the government may disagree.
The petitioners must respond to unique arguments raised by
the intervenors, and, as has happened, each may claim a right
to recover attorney's fees from the government. In Northern
PlainsResource Council v. EPA,52 the Ninth Circuit awarded
the petitioner fees for arguments it advanced to counter
positions taken by the Montana Power Company, an intervenor on EPA's behalf over whose arguments EPA exercised no
control. As in the case of awards to industry litigants discussed previously, it is difficult to reconcile this result with
the purposes of the fee statutes. Such an award does not
encourage "watchdog" litigation but penalizes the government with respect to the acts of a third party.
V. The Nature of the Challenge
In Alabama Power,the government opposed a fee award
to the District of Columbia in part because the District's
substantive claims did not seek to enhance the quality of the
air, a goal of the Clean Air Act. The District of Columbia
argued for a less stringent regulation than EPA had promulgated. Alabama Power resolved the fee issue against the
government. The court looked to the legislative history and
found that Congress intended to "encourage litigation that
[would] assure proper implementation and administration of
51. See API v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176; Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33;
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (1983).
52. 670 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Sierra Club, 672 F.2d at 46.
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the act or otherwise serve the public interest."5 Such litigation, the court reasoned, may be "pro-environment" or "nonpro-environment," and either characterization may help to
realize the goals by presenting "disputed issues" for resolution.54
Judge Wilkey took the Alabama Power analysis one step
further. In KaktovikS 5 the court denied attorneys' fees to proenvironment plaintiffs because they did not contribute "substantially" to the nonenvironmental goals of OCSLA.- The
"basic purpose" of the statute is to "promote the swift, orderly
and efficient exploitation of ... domestic oil and gas re-

serves."57 Kaktovik did not advance these goals. In fact, the
lawsuit delayed the leasing process.- The court distinguished
the goals of OCSLA from those of the Clean Air Act and
TSCA. This analysis, however, is suspect. Since the goals of
OCSLA appear to be internally inconsistent,5 9 no single litigant suing under OCSLA will ever promote all of the statute's
goals. This leads to the logical but absurd conclusion that no
one can ever be entitled to a fee award under the statute.
Which statutory "goals" are relevant to the appropriateness standard? This question goes to the heart of the language
chosen by Congress for these statutory provisions. Most statutes have many goals. Some involve ideas of social priority
while others deal with administrative reform, or at least good
administrative practice. If a party challenges EPA's emission
standards for diesel cars on the ground that they are "unat53. Alabama Power, 672 F.2d at 5 n.21 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 337 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1077, 1416).
54. Judge Wilkey, in his dissent, concurs with the majority that an issue does
not have to be proenvironment to further an act's goals. He apparently believed that
the SierraClub panel did not agree with this position. See 672 F.2d at 16 (dissenting
opinion). The SierraClub opinion is ambiguous on the point. Id. at 38 n.8.
55. 689 F.2d 222.
56. Id. at 226.
57. Id. at 225 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 53 (1977)).
58. Astoundingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that they had
achieved valuable statutory goals under ESA because the court was only in "qualified
agreement" with the plaintiffs' statutory interpretation. It was on this very issue of
statutory construction that the plaintiffs had prevailed. 689 F.2d at 277 n.38.
59. See NRDC v. Costle, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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tainable," does that party seek to advance the goals of the
Clean Air Act any less than a litigant who challenges emission standards on the ground that they are insufficient to
protect public health? Each seeks to further a different goal of
the same statute-one, technological feasibility, the other,
lower pollutant emissions.0 The goals compel different
results. Statutory goals, therefore, are a poor measure of
entitlement to attorneys' fee awards because an award may
depend upon the arbitrary selection of one statutory goal.
VI. Proposal
The tests evolving in the D.C. Circuit seem to lead down a
blind alley. Neither the Sierra Club nor the Kaktovik approach provides the means to separate deserving litigants
from the undeserving. A fresh analysis should begin with the
assumptions implicitly recognized in both cases. By making
the award, Congress (1) intended to encourage litigation that
aids in effectuating the underlying goals of the statute; (2) did
not intend for the public to underwrite frivolous litigation or
litigation that raises interesting, but nonsubstantive issues;
and (3) did not intend to reimburse litigants whose interest in
the substantive outcome is motivated by their own economic
interests. Application of these assumptions leads to the articulation of four standards:
(1)A litigant must prevail on at least one substantive
issue to be compensated. Compensation will be
awarded solely for time spent on those substantive
issues on which the litigant prevails. This will eliminate any incentive to bring complex and interesting
yet meritless claims to inflate the bill. It will also avoid
a determination of whether the substantive issues
raised were significant enough to warrant a fee award.
The attempt to resolve such an issue doomed Sierra
Club and Kaktovik to the essentially useless exercise of
counting pages. This will foster judicial economy by
expediting determination of attorneys' fee awards;
60. Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 225-26.
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(2)A nonprevailing party may be compensated only if:
(a) the litigation is settled prior to judgment and the
government materially alters its action in response to the issues raised by the litigant;
(b) the government voluntarily suspends, withdraws,
rescinds, or changes the challenged action in a
way that moots the litigation after full briefs are
filed.
(These narrow exceptions to the prevailing party rule
are consistent with the reasoning of the earlier citizen
suit cases, such as NRDC v. EPA, 61 and Metropolitan
Washington Coalitionfor Clean Air v. District of Columbia,6 2 and prevent the government from terminating an otherwise meritorious claim by last-minute
unilateral action);
(3)Fee awards should be made only for issues that arise
out of the statute containing the attorneys' fee provision. Thus, a litigant who raises issues that arise
under the Administrative Procedure Act should not be
compensated even if he prevails on those issues; and
(4)The claimant should be required to certify that the
issues for which fees are sought would not, if decided in
the claimant's favor, result in an economic benefit.
VII. Conclusion
The environmental attorneys' fee provisions pose an interesting problem of statutory construction for the Supreme
Court. The Court may announce a rule in Sierra Club which
will be instructive for the resolution of future cases. Arguably, Congress left it to the courts to make awards in cases on
an ad hoc basis, allowing for the development of a common
law of attorneys' fee awards under these statutes. Indeed, a
review of the extant opinions reveals a working out of rules
from various fact patterns in common law fashion.
Hopefully, whatever standard the Court chooses to artic-

61. 484 F.2d 1331.
62. 639 F.2d 802.
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ulate will be easy to apply. The D.C. Circuit's recent efforts
are cumbersome because an in-depth analysis of the controversy is required to determine whether an award is appropriate. Judges are already overburdened by the issues brought
before them. Adding to that burden a SierraClub or Kaktovik
analysis elevates the tail end of the regulatory litigation cycle
to a level it does not deserve.
VIII. Postscript
Since this Article went to press, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club.63 The majority held that "absentsome degree of
success on the merits by the claimant,it is not 'appropriate'for
a federal court to award attorney'sfees under § 307(f)'64 of the
Clean Air Act. FourJustices dissented.

63. 51 U.S.L.W. 5132 (U.S. July 1, 1983).
64. Id. at 3136.
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